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Assessing the value of legal claims is the sixty-four thousand
dollar question (no pun intended) of civil litigation. Clients, as every
litigator knows, often come into their attorneys' offices with a belief
that they know how much their claim is worth. The attorney is then
asked to validate that number. Alternately, clients can come to their
attorneys with a grievance-I have been injured, a counter-party
breached its contract with me, I have been fired, our rainforest has
been devastated by a mining company-and ask the attorney for an
assessment of how much their grievance might be worth. Contingency
lawyers, who function as both attorneys and financiers, must make
successful predictions on value in order to remain solvent, let alone to
rake in a handsome profit, especially when contingency work is the
entirety or the lion's share of their practice.'
Various developments in the legal profession and the market
for legal services suggest that valuing legal claims may soon further
affect additional circles of stakeholders. In the United Kingdom-the
jurisdiction that pioneered the globalization of law firms2 and the
liquidity in legal claims 3-the Legal Services Act recently legalized
ownership of law firms by nonlawyers. 4 As with the newfound
liquidity of legal claims, here too the United Kingdom is bringing an
Australian innovation closer to home. In a closely watched
development in Australia, the plaintiffs' firm Slater & Gordon Ltd.
became the first-ever publically traded law firm, listing its shares on
the Australian Stock Exchange.5
1. See generally HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY
FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 10-16 (2004) (applying Modern Portfolio Theory to
contingency fee lawyering).
2. James W. Jones, Hilderbrandt Int'l, Presentation at the Harvard Law School
Symposium on Globalization of the Legal Profession: Perspectives on the Global Law Firm 8
(Nov. 21, 2008), available at http://www.law.harvard.edulprograms/plp/pdf/Jones.pdf ("Large UK
firms focused on global markets far earlier than most of their US counterparts.").
3. See Arkin v. Borchard Lines Ltd., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 655, [17], [38]-[44] (Eng.)
(loosening the champerty restriction and facilitating trading in legal claims). Australia actually
paved the way, followed closely by the United Kingdom. However, it is the use of ALF in the
United Kingdom, the home of the "magic circle" firms that are direct competitors of the "AmLaw
100" firms, that placed competitive pressures on American firms to adopt and advocate for the
practice. Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is It Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Financing, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 1268, 1278-82 (2011).
4. Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29, §§ 71-111 (Eng.) (allowing investment in British law
firms).
5. Peter Lattman, Slater & Gordon: The World's First Publicly Traded Law Firm, WALL
ST. J. L. BLOG (May 22, 2007, 9:19 AM), http:/Iblogs.wsj.com/law/2007/05/22/slater-gordon-the-
worlds-first-publicly-traded-law-firm/. Slater & Gordon's fascinating prospectus is available at
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This development is likely to place pressure on rules of
professional responsibility, which currently prohibit such ownership in
all but one jurisdiction (the District of Columbia) of the United
States.6 Indeed, there are lawsuits currently pending in three federal
district courts, all filed by the plaintiffs' firm Jacoby & Meyers,
against the states of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut,
claiming that state laws that prohibit nonlawyers from owning a stake
in law firms unconstitutionally restrict freedom of speech, freedom of
association, and interstate commerce.7 Moreover, experimentations
with creative business structures that de facto allow non-lawyers to
(indirectly) profit from law firms are already underway in the United
States. One example is Clearspire, which describes itself as having
"reimagined everything a law firm can be[] [a]nd brought it to life with
highly innovative business practices." Specifically, Clearspire is
structured as three separate legal entities: a law firm, a service
company (owned by nonlawyers), and an IT company.9 Such indirect
or direct investors in law firms that do any measure of contingency
work would, one imagines, be intensely interested in placing a value
on the legal claims in which the firm has a contingent stake.
Another example is the relationship between Juridica Capital
Management, one of the first and largest litigation funding firms to
operate in the United States, and the law firm Fields & Scrantom. The
relationship has been described as follows:
http://www.slatergordon.com.aulfiles/editor upload/File/Final%20EOP%2OProspectus%20includi
ng%20Schedules.pdf.
6. D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2013); see also, Victoria Shannon, The Funder
as Co-Counsel: A Glimpse into the Future of Law Firm Ownership, MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONT.
(Mar. 11, 2003), http://litigationfinancecontract.com/the-funder-as-co-counsel-a-glimpse-into-the-
future-of-law-firm-ownership/ (discussing the rule).
7. See Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices, 847 F. Supp. 2d 590, 591-92 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (explaining plaintiffs argument); Complaint at 3-4, Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices, LLP v.
Justices of the Supreme Court of N.J., No. 11-cv-02866-JAP (D.N.J. May 18, 2011), available at
http://legalaccessforall.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05[NJComplaint.pdf (arguing that outside
investment should be allowed in the American legal system because current practices are
antiquated and perpetuate inequality); Complaint at 3-4, Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices, LLP v.
Judges of the Conn. Superior Court, No. 11-cv-00817-CFD (D. Conn. May 18, 2011), available at
http://forctlawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/1-main-Connecticutl.pdf (same argument).
8. CLEARSPIRE, http://www.clearspire.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2013). This narrative goes
on to say that in addition to "an entirely new business model," Clearspire has embraced "the end
of the billable hour." Id.
9. The New Model, CLEARSPIRE, http://www.clearspire.comlnew-model (last visited Mar.
21, 2013). Clearspire Law Company, LLC "retains sole responsibility for the practice of law,"
Clearspire Service Company "conducts all activities outside of the law practice," and the IT
platform supports both companies. Id.
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"[Richard Fields and Timothy Scrantom, co-founders and co-principles of Juridica's
investment management arm,] also own[] Washington DC-based firm Fields &
Scrantom, one of a selection of firms to which Juridica will supply indirect investment in
cases where plaintiffs either cannot have, or do not want, direct investment. Around
140m has been earmarked for this."10
Third-party funders of litigation (such as Juridica) are
managers of portfolios of litigation and therefore have an obvious
stake in the question of how to price legal claims. Litigation-funding
firms, some of which are publically traded companies," not only put
their own time, efforts, and capital on the line but also solicit capital
from investors based on a business model that presumes that funders
can-and are good at-assessing the value of the investments they
purchase for investors. Therefore, with the litigation-funding
industry's recent explosion onto the scene, 12 the circle of those affected
by the feasibility of claim valuation has been expanded. But at the
heart of legal claim valuation is a conundrum. Many experienced
lawyers would agree with both the statement that litigation outcomes
are inherently and substantially uncertain and the statement that
experienced lawyers can vet and sort promising lawsuits from
unpromising ones. Like hard-core pornography, claim value is hard to
define, but lawyers believe they know it when they see it.13
10. Caroline Binham, Juridica Attracts Investment as the First Specialist Litigation Fund to
Float in UK, LAWYER (Jan. 14, 2008), http://www.thelawyer.com/juridica-attracts-investment-as-
the-first-specialist-litigation-fund-to-float-in-uk/130705.article.
11. See BURFORD, http://www.burfordcapital.com/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2013) (explaining
the business model of a litigation-and-arbitration-funding firm operating in the United States);
IMF (AUSTRALIA) LTD, http://www.imf.com.aul (last visited Mar. 21, 2013) (an example of a
publicly traded litigation funding firm in Australia); JURIDICA CAP. MGMT. LTD,
http://www.juridica.co.uk/about.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (explaining the business model of
a publicly traded litigation funding firm in the United Kingdom).
12. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 380
(2009) (discussing inter alia the difficulty in pricing litigation risk and suggesting as a solution
"an 'after-the-event' insurance policy [for defendants] that would protect [defendants] against a
higher-than-expected judgment"); see also Michele DeStephano, Nonlawyers Influencing
Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen or Stone Soup? 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791 (2012);
Stephen Gillers, Waiting for Good Dough: Litigation Funding Comes to Law, 43 AKRON L. REV.
667, 669 (2010) (arguing that courts' concept of champerty has promoted injustice and prevented
legitimate investment in legal claims); Deborah Hensler, Financing Civil Litigation: The US
Perspective, in NEW TRENDS IN FINANCING CIVIL LITIGATION IN EUROPE: A LEGAL, EMPIRICAL,
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 149, 151 (Mark Tuil & Louis Visscher eds., 2010); Anthony J. Sebok,
The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 120-32 (2011) (arguing that the notion of
"inauthentic claims" is poor justification for preventing outside investment in legal markets); W.
Bradley Wendel, Alternative Litigation Financing and Anti-Commodification Norms, 63 DEPAUL
L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2261343
13. Alluding, of course, to Justice Stewart's famous remark in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). For an illustration of the conundrum, see, for example,
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Given the importance of accurate claim pricing, it is
unsurprising that scholars have opined on the issue in a variety of
contexts and from a variety of perspectives. It would be impossible to
do justice to all of them in this Article (though Part III does attempt to
categorize the literature in an illuminating way and provide examples
of the leading schools of thought). Breaking from previous scholarship,
this Article seeks to tackle the issue from a new perspective. It asks
how parties to a third-party funding agreement should deal with
pricing in their contracts given the inherent difficulty in pricing legal
claims.14 It answers that a practical solution lies with staged funding
in a manner similar to the funding of start-ups by venture capitalists.
This Article focuses on third-party funding, not contingency fees,
because staged funding of contingency fees would require careful
considerations of various ethics regulations (like a client's control of
her case, duty of loyalty, and other requirements). However, many of
the underlying considerations would be similar.
This Article is part of a larger project which views the funding
of commercial 5 legal claims as similar, in important respects, to
portfolio companies and venture capital ("VC"), more so than
contingency fees or insurance. In a nutshell, this comparison is
appropriate because, given the assets involved, both types of funding
are characterized by extreme uncertainty, extreme information
asymmetry, extreme agency problems (conflicts of interest and, in
the following online debate between Mark Bello, the CEO of Lawsuit Financials, and Edward
Reilly, the cofounder of Themis Capital, sparked by Reilly's post on the suggestion to use
milestones in funded litigation. See Maya Steinitz, MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONT.,
http://litigationfinancecontract.com/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2013) (creating and providing a forum
for this debate); Edward A. Reilly, Jr., Milestones: A Response, MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONT. (Feb. 18,
2013), http://litigationfinancecontract.com/milestones-a-response/. Mark Bello disagreed with the
statement that "litigation values do not fluctuate materially during the course of the case," and
stated that "[he has] found, in 36 years of combined legal and legal funding experience, that
there are so many intangibles in litigation and so much can happen with evidence and
discovery ... that even excellent underwriting sometimes can't prevent substandard litigation
results." Mark Bello, Comment to Milestones: A Response, supra. Reilly then responded to Bello's
comment that "[w]hen compared with the outcomes of venture capital investments, successful
outcomes from litigation funding investments are relatively predictable and outcomes are within
an identifiable range." Reilly, supra.
14. The problem and the solutions offered herein are equally salient to contingency fee
arraignments. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of how certain standard features in
contingency fee arrangements can be understood as rudimentary forms of staging.
15. Commercial legal claims should be distinguished from personal claims, such as personal
injuries and divorces, as well as nonpersonal torts, such as environmental torts. For more on that
distinction and, in particular, the risk of commodifying these kinds of claims, see Steinitz, supra
note 3, at 1318-22.
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particular, moral hazard),16 and the problem of effort provision. 7
Therefore, I have previously argued that based on economic theory,
VC contracts and the organizational structure of VC firms can provide
a model for litigation-funding contracts and firms.'8 In a future piece,
a coauthor and I will provide a full model litigation-funding contract
that translates this theory into practice by exemplifying, with concrete
contractual language and commentary, how parties may adopt and
adapt VC contracts to litigation funding."9 In the current piece, I delve
into the financial theory of the hallmark feature of VC: staged
funding. I also explore the financial theory of litigation to show how
staging can (1) accommodate the uncertain value of legal claims,
which can be understood as assets; (2) accommodate the uncertainty
16. Moral hazard, generally, is a type of agency problem in which one party, the agent, is
responsible for the interests of another, the principal, but has an incentive to put its own
interests first. See Kevin Dowd, Moral Hazard and the Financial Crisis, 29 CATO J. 141, 142
(2009). The agent, who is insulated from risk, may behave differently from the way it would
behave if it would be fully exposed to the risk. See id. In the insurance context, moral hazard
refers to "the tendency of insurance protection to alter an individual's motive to prevent loss.
This affects expenses for the insurer and therefore, ultimately, the cost of coverage for
individuals." Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541, 541 (1979).
17. See Zsuzsanna Fluck et al., Venture Capital Contracting and Syndication: An
Experiment in Computational Corporate Finance § 1.1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 11624, 2005):
Venture capital brings together one or more entrepreneurs, who contribute ideas,
plans, human capital and effort, and private investors, who contribute experience,
expertise, contacts and most of the money. For simplicity, we will refer to one
entrepreneur and to one initial venture-capital investor. Their joint participation
creates a two-way incentive problem. The investor has to share financial payoffs with
the entrepreneur in order to secure her commitment and effort. Thus the investor may
not be willing to participate even if the start-up has positive overall NPV. Second, the
entrepreneur will underinvest in effort if she has to share her marginal value added
with the investor.
18. For the full case of this analogy and its analytic implications, see Maya Steinitz, The
Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455 (2012) [hereinafter Steinitz, The
Contract]. I then developed an online platform, see Steinitz, supra note 13, to "crowd source"
litigation-funding contracting-namely, to invite lawyers, funders, clients and others to opine on
model provisions and suggest their own.
19. This collaborative piece is forthcoming in M. Steinitz & Abigail C. Field, A Model
Litigation Funding Contract, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (on file with authors). In it, we
bargain "behind a veil of ignorance," to borrow John Rawls's term for his social contract exercise.
Namely, we try to devise a hypothetical contract that would be profitable for funders and fair to
plaintiffs all the while dancing between the raindrops that are the various regulatory
restrictions, including champerty, fee-splitting prohibition, usury prohibition, and more. That
hypothetical deal has other important features. On the financial side, it is structured as the sale
of securities rather than as a secured loan. It provides for the ability to accelerate and
supplement the investment. It provides downside protection to the investors on the one hand and
a minimum plaintiff recovery (to avoid unconscionability problems) on the other. It also provides
important nonfinancial features such as various representations and warranties, duty to
cooperate, a fiduciary duty, and more. See generally id.
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relating to the ultimate costs of litigation (i.e., transaction costs),
which diminish the value of the asset; and (3) address the sequential
nature and nonmonotonic value of the option to settle. When the
pricing of legal claims is adjusted using staging to accommodate for
fluctuations in transaction costs and the value of the asset and option,
efficiency and fairness are maximized for both the claimant and the
financier.
Part II provides a definition of staged funding. Then, by
recasting common contingency fee practices as simple (and deficient)
forms of staged funding, it argues that staged funding of litigation is
not new but rather only underdeveloped. It also provides some
evidence that simple forms of staging are used in the newly emerged
third-party funding industry. Part III provides a brief overview of the
history of the law and economics of claim valuations. It first describes
how neoclassical law and economics revolutionized the way we think
of legal disputes by conceptualizing them as assets. It then describes
how behavioral economics allowed refinement of economic analysis by
accounting for actual human behavior. Part III continues by
describing how the financial theory of litigation has further advanced
our thinking of the economics of litigation by introducing a real
options approach. Finally, Part III describes how the accounting world
regards lawsuits. Part IV adds another layer by explaining how
funding litigation differs from funding start-ups (the focus of VC
economics). It then concludes with a description of contract-design
choices that may be appropriated in funded litigation that uses staged
funding.
II. STAGED FUNDING IN CONTINGENCY CASES AND THIRD-PARTY
FUNDING: THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
In this Section, I define staged funding; describe current usage;
explore how staged funding has the potential to sidestep the
impossibility of accurately pricing litigation ex ante by allowing
repricing and exit, which are both pegged to information disclosure;
and explain the deficiencies and missed opportunities that
characterize current practices.
A. Staged Funding Described
Staged funding is an iterative process used to provide the
portfolio company with capital in return for ownership (shares) in the
company. It allows the company to move from one stage of its
2013] 1895
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development to the next while allowing funders to minimize risk.
Among other things, staging allows both funders and entrepreneurs to
learn the value of the investment as well as matters that affect it,
such as each party's honesty, its level of effort, the forum in which the
litigation is taking place, and other factors. Staged funding assumes
that "the entrepreneur and venture capitalist cannot write a complete
contract to specify the terms of future financing. The terms are
determined by bargaining as financing is raised stage by stage."20 It
thus constitutes the start-up--or in our case, the litigation-as a
compound call option.21
Options afford a right, but not an obligation, to engage in a
future transaction-specifically, to buy or sell an underlying asset at a
predetermined price (called the "strike price") on or before a specific
date. Options that provide a right to buy an asset are called "call
options," whereas options to sell an asset are called "put options."22
Options often accompany a stock and allow the investor an
opportunity to change the term of the stock.23 The more volatile the
underlying asset, the more an option is worth.24 When purchasing an
option, the buyer is "paying money today for the opportunity to make
a further investment. To put it another way, the company is acquiring
growth opportunities."25 But options "rarely come with a large label
attached. Often the trickiest part of the problem is ... identify[ing an
option]."26 Finally, compound options are options on an option.27
20. Fluck et al., supra note 17, § 1.1.2. On the theory of incomplete contracts more
generally, see Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, 886-900 (1978); Ian
R. Macneil, Reflections on Relational Contract Theory After a Neoclassical Seminar, in IMPLICIT
DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT 207, 207-17 (David Campbell et al. eds., 2003) (explaining the
perspective of relational contract theory). On litigation financing and incomplete contracts, see
Steinitz, The Contract, supra note 18.
21. Fluck et al., supra note 17, § 1.1.2.
22. See generally STEWART C. MYERS & RICHARD A. BREALEY, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 539-94 (7th ed. 2003) (explaining the concepts and theories of corporate options).
Common stocks are call options written on a firm's assets. Id. at 582.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 581. More generally, an option's value is influenced by the following:
[Tihe higher the price of the asset, the more valuable an option to buy it. The lower
the price that you must pay to exercise the call, the more valuable the option. You do
not need to pay the exercise price until the option expires. This delay is most valuable
when the interest rate is high. . . . Finally, a long-term option is more valuable than a
short-term option. A distant maturity delays the point at which the holder needs to
pay the exercise price and increases the chance of a large jump in the stock price
before the option matures.
Id. at 591.
25. Id. at 563.
26. Id. at 575.
1896 [Vol. 66:6:1889
PRICING LEGAL CLAIMS
Real options provide a new and productive way to view
corporate investment decisions as options. Multistage or sequential
investment decisions are an important class of real options with
embedded managerial flexibility. These multistage real options
involve a bundle of interrelated investment opportunities, with the
early upstream opportunities creating potentially valuable
discretionary downstream opportunities. 28
Staged funding occurs in a series of investment rounds, each
corresponding with business milestones such as the completion of a
business plan, the demonstration of technology, or the introduction of
a product into the market. At each stage, the project is valued anew,
and shares are issued in exchange for additional funding.29 In return
for its investment, the venture capitalist usually receives convertible
preferred stock at each round. This means that if the company is
terminated, the venture capitalists have a senior claim on its assets. If
the firm is successful and is taken public or sold, the shares convert to
common stock.30 The number of shares received at each round is
determined by a valuation of the project conducted during that round.
Each round is done through a separate contract, and the new shares
are identified as Series A, Series B, and so forth.
VC virtually never proceeds through secured lending. 31 The
current practice32 in litigation funding, conversely, seems to be a type
27. Id. at 1041.
28. Hemantha S.B. Herath & Chan S. Park, Multi-Stage Capital Investment Opportunities
as Compound Real Options, 47 ENGINEERING ECONOMIST 1 (2002) (emphasis added).
29. George W. Fenn et al., The Economics of the Private Equity Market, in 168 BOARD OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: STAFF STUDIES (1995); Fluck et al., supra note
17, § 1 (citing earlier work on staged funding, including PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE
VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE (2006); Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An
Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements, 39 J.L. & ECON. 463 (1996); Paul A.
Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring and the Staging of Venture Capital, 50 J. FIN. 1461
(1995); Thomas Hellmann & Manju Puri, The Interaction Between Product Market and
Financing Strategy: The Role of Venture Capital, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 959 (2000); Thomas
Hellmann & Manju Puri, Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-up Firms:
Empirical Evidence, 57 J. FIN. 169 (2002); Steven Kaplan & Per Str6mberg, Financial
Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts,
70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281 (2003); Josh Lerner, The Syndication of Venture Capital Investments,
23 FIN. MGMT. 16 (1994); William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital
Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473 (1990)).
30. Fluck et al., supra note 17, § 1.1.2.
31. Id.
32. Based on multiple discussions between the author and funders. The explanation would
seem to be path dependency. Commercial litigation funding has its roots, inter alia, in consumer
funding, and those have to be carried out as nonrecourse lending (for reasons that are beyond the
scope of this paper). For a description of the evolution of the consumer-funding industry, see
2013] 1897
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of lending-nonrecourse lending--coupled with very basic forms of
staging. At milestones within a staged-funding round, funders can
purchase additional shares based on the valuation and purchase price
used at the beginning of the round.33
Critically, in VC, the rounds and milestones correspond with
points at which the information, and therefore the risk profile,
significantly changes. Since the value of the start-up progressively
grows over time (or else the start-up fails and is terminated), staging
allows for new valuations in each round and a new share purchase
price that reflects the new information, such that both the
entrepreneur and the funder can get appropriate value. The venture
capitalists obtain some, but not entire, control over the start-up. In
particular, they gain the ability to shut down the enterprise if it seems
like a losing proposition. 34 Thus, in addition to tying pricing to
information disclosure, staged funding also ties exit to information
disclosure. As such, staged financing addresses information
asymmetry and extreme uncertainty by allowing the funder to either
reassess the extent of its involvement based on an updated valuation
as more information is revealed, or simply decline to participate
further. Staged financing also addresses agency costs: the risk of
losing future funding incentivizes entrepreneurs to cooperate and
expand efforts. The iterative nature of staged funding allows the
parties to increase or decrease expenditures as necessary. Staged
funding can provide all of these benefits to the funding of litigation.
However, staging comes with a price: it creates a holdup
problem. The holdup problem arises due to the disproportionate
bargaining power the funder has by virtue of its ability to shut down
the company by ceasing funding. A monopolist funder may hold up the
claimant at each valuation negotiation.35 Research indicates that
Nora Freeman Engstrom, Lawyer Lending: Costs and Consequences, 63 DEPAUL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014).
33. See Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 29, at 283 n.4. Various cash flow and control rights
can be contingent on various milestones being met within a given financing round. Id. However,
pricing appears stable within a round. See id.; see also Antonio Davila et al., Staging Venture
Capital: Empirical Evidence on the Differential Roles of Early Versus Late Rounds 2 (Feb. 2003)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://apps.olin.wustl.edu/workingpapers/pdf/2003-07-
003.pdf.
34. Fluck et al., supra note 17, at 4; Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 29, 288-89 tbl.2
(regarding level of control).
35. Cf. Fluck et al., supra note 17, at 11; Carsten Bienz & Julia Hirsch, The Dynamics of
Venture Capital Contracts (Ctr. for Fin. Stud., Working Paper No. 2006/11, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=675669 (documenting that contracts between
venture capitalists and their portfolio firms specify more complete conditions for future financing
for firms that have no suitable outside financing option and therefore lower ex post bargaining
1898 [Vol. 66:6:1889
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staged funding by monopolist VC funds produces suboptimal
outcomes, meaning companies that would have succeeded can
ultimately fail due to holdup.3 6 One could speculate that a similar
problem of meritorious claims being prematurely terminated may
develop in funded litigation.
The existence of multiple funders participating in later rounds
(syndication), resolves holdup and increases an entrepreneur's-or in
our case, the plaintiff's-ability to gain from improved information, as
well as from its efforts to enhance value in between funding rounds.
Competition in funding redistributes the bargaining power between
the funder and the funded.37 Research shows that the entrepreneur's
ownership share increases with the value of the project when later
stages of the investment are syndicated.38 Here too, one could
speculate that staging and syndication may have similar claimant-
favoring redistributive effects if properly structured in litigation
funding.
B. Staged Funding in Contingency Fees and Contemporary Third-
Party Funding
Staging, albeit not thus conceived of, is common when lawyers
invest in lawsuits via contingency arrangements. Typically, such
arrangements involve incremental expenditures by the lawyers; an
increasing stake in the proceeds that is pegged to milestones (usually
pretrial, posttrial, and appeal); and a right to exit (e.g., a right not to
represent at trial or in an appeal).39 For example, an ABA publication
provides a Standard Contingent Fee Engagement Letter that contains
the following clause (titled "Legal Fees, Expenses and Billing"):
Instead of the usual fee arrangement, [Client] has requested [Law Firm Name] to
provide representation for a contingency fee. [Client] agrees the fee shall be [number]%
of all sums recovered from the time of commencement of trial or arbitration hearing
through verdict, award or decision; [number]% of all sums recovered thereafter if an
power). The authors' result is consistent with theories of holdup, where complete contracts
protect the entrepreneur from expropriation by the financier. Id.
36. See Fluck et al., supra note 17, at 11-13, 25.
37. See id. at 14.
38. Id. at 4, 14, 16 (noting that competitive syndication of a second round of financing better
protects the entrepreneur from share dilution).
39. In addition, "[s]ome lawyers have a client sign what effectively is an option for the
lawyer to handle the case, which gives the lawyer the authority to conduct investigatory
activities but allows the lawyer to decide to drop the case depending on the results of the
investigation." See KRITZER, supra note 1, at 114.
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appeal is undertaken; and [number]% of all sums recovered if the matter is later
retried. 4 0
This is phased capital infusion. The same form also provides for
termination rights "if [Client] fails to cooperate, if [Client]
misrepresents material facts, [or] if [Client] fails to follow the advice of
[Law Firm Name]. "41 This allows the attorney to cut her losses as
information about the case and the client's efforts is revealed.
The same publication also provides for the following form of
phased capital infusion in a standard form (titled "Complex Sliding-
Scale Contingency Fee in Commercial Litigation; Partial Assignment
of Cause of Action; Complex Agreement Regarding Fees if
Engagement is Settled or Terminated Early"):
[Law Firm Name] will receive twenty percent (20%) of the gross sum recovered by
settlement before commencement of trial. After commencement of trial, [Law Firm
Name] will receive the following percentages of the gross sum recovered by settlement
or judgment: 1. Twenty-five percent (25%) of the first $7 million plus, 2. Thirty-three
and one-third percent (33.3%) of amounts recovered that exceed $7 million.4 2
This form provides for more elaborate termination rights for
the lawyers and, therefore, greater control over the course of the
litigation and settlement decisions. In addition to the termination
rights above, it allows the lawyers to terminate the engagement
if the client elects to abandon any cause of action that in the opinion of the [law firm)
materially jeopardizes the prospects of successful prosecution of Client's claims; should
the conduct of the Client materially prejudice the prospects of successful prosecution of
Client's claims; [] Change of ownership of the Client . . . Should the Client unreasonably
withhold consent to a settlement proposal that in the judgment of [the law firm] is a fair
and reasonable basis for disposition of the cause . . .Filing of a bankruptcy proceedings
by or against any Client .. . Should it become the opinion of [the law firm] at any time
that Client's cause of action lacks merit (for example, because of inability to verify
Client's claims through witnesses[,] because of adverse developments in the law or
because of a materially adverse change in the financial condition of the defendant).4
3
The nascent third-party funding industry lacks transparency,
and the content of funding agreements, in particular, is highly
guarded proprietary information. 44 Therefore, it is impossible to
generalize what are common practices. But at least one contract that
made it into the public domain-and which is understood to, generally
40. GARY A. MUNNEKE & ANTHONY E. DAVIS, THE ESSENTIAL FORMBOOK: COMPREHENSIVE
MANAGEMENT TOOLS FOR LAWYERS 191 (2001 & Supp. 2007) (Form 6).
41. Id. at 193.
42. Id. at 225-26.
43. Id.
44. See Steinitz, The Contract, supra note 18, at 12.
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speaking, be representative of industry standardS45-- Contained the
following form of staging:
The Capital Commitment shall be funded . . . in the following Tranches: (i) An initial
Tranche in the amount of $4,000,000[;] (ii) A second Tranche in the amount of
$5,500,000[; and] A third Tranche in the amount of $5,500,000 ... [The Claimants shall
have the right to call two additional Tranches ... thirty days prior to the date in which
[counsel] reasonably believes that the balance ... will fall below $1,000,000.46
The agreement goes on to condition the second tranche on
various steps that will potentially bind all members of the class
(group) in the underlying litigation, ensure that lawyers under the
control of the funders receive full reign, and require establishment of
trusts that hold certain litigation rights and proceeds. In other words,
there is a requirement that various risks have to be reduced-via
meeting certain milestones-before additional funds are released.
The agreement also includes termination rights in case of
breach of a material condition or noncompliance with representation
and warranties that result in "a material adverse impact on the value
of the claim and the recovery amount."47 Among the conditions
identified as material are a duty to instruct the lawyers to provide the
funder with any and all material documentation, documents, and
written advice of counsel; a duty to respond to reasonable requests for
material information; 48 a duty to irrevocably instruct counsel to keep
the funder fully and continually informed of all material
developments; and a duty to cooperate and devote sufficient time to
the claim.49 Material representations and warranties include any
representation relating to conduct that would materially affect the
45. This is Burford Capital's investment in a group claim (similar to a class action) of
Ecuadorians against Chevron, which I have discussed at length elsewhere. See id. Fortune
magazine described this investment in the following terms:
[Burford is] the largest and most experienced international dispute funder in the
world," as its promotional materials state, so we're not looking here at some
aberrational outlier in the field . .. [And,] we can be assured that Burford's conduct
probably represents the very best practices the young industry has to offer.
Roger Parloff, Have You Got a Piece of This Lawsuit?, FORTUNE (May 31, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://
features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2011/05/31/have-you-got-a-piece-of-this-lawsuit. Anthony Sebok,
"who has made a subspecialty of probing the legal and ethical questions surrounding litigation
finance," has been quoted as saying that there is "nothing unusual from [the] point of view of the
litigation finance world" in this contract. Daniel Fisher, Litigation-Finance Contract Reveals How
Investors Back Lawsuits, FORBES (June 6, 2011, 7:12 AM), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/danielfisher/2011/06/07/litigation-finance-contract-reveals-how-investors-back-lawsuits.
46. Burford Funding Agreement between Treca Financial Solutions and Claimants § 2 (Oct.
31, 2010) (on file with author).
47. Id. § 11.
48. Id. § 13.1(a)-(d).
49. Id. § 5.1.
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claim, guarding against the possibility that the funder receives a
lesser proportion of the award than he had bargained for, and any
assurance against the claim being impaired or voided. Importantly,
the latter includes a representation and warranty that:
Claimant has disclosed to Funder all documentation and other information in its
possession or control relevant to the Claim and there is no information in the
knowledge, possession or control of the Claimants [sic] ... that is or is reasonably likely
to be material to the Funder's assessment of the Claim that has not been disclosed to
the Funder, and the Claimant believes ... that the Claim is meritorious and likely to
prevail. 50
In other words, these arrangements set up iterative
investments and allow the investor (whether lawyer or financier) to
exit the investment and, therefore, to control risk. In the case of the
third-party funding agreement, exit is tied to information disclosure,
effort provision, and a material change in claim value.
Notably, all of the above examples share an important
characteristic: they fail to allow repricing based on the new
information. It goes without saying that they therefore do not allow
the plaintiff (as opposed to funder and attorney) to benefit from the
new information and incorporate it into the price of the asset being
sold. This is so even when parts of the asset (i.e., the additional
percentages the attorney gets as the litigation progresses) have not yet
been transferred. The plaintiff is similarly deprived of an opportunity
to capture any part of any value enhancement that may be due to its
efforts (thus disincentivizing efforts, to the detriment of all involved)
or to exogenous factors (e.g., a fortuitous value increase due to case
developments, such as opposing party's diminished ability to pursue
its case). The funder, similarly, cannot bargain for a better price based
on new information regarding higher risk. Its only option is to
terminate rather than to negotiate for a higher return. Last but not
least, holdup in the examples above is facilitated rather than
mitigated.
In sum, while current forms of staged funding allow some
downside protection to funders (lawyers and financiers), they fail to
provide plaintiffs with the benefits afforded to entrepreneurs in the
VC context. In other words, the examples above illustrate that current
practices do a poor job of addressing the true complexity of valuing
legal claims and miss out on opportunities to maximize efficiency for
all parties.
50. Id. § 10.2(1.
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The next Section more fully explains the sources and the
difficulty of pricing litigation, reconceived as a (somewhat) liquid
asset-namely, one that can be traded. The next Section also suggests
how to adapt the sophisticated form of staged funding familiar in VC
to litigation funding.
III. LEGAL CLAIMS AS ASSETS AND THE OPTION TO SETTLE (A VERY
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LAW & ECONOMICS OF CLAIM VALUATION)
Funded litigation has either two or three types of investors.
First is the plaintiff.5 1 Second are the third-party funders. And third
are the litigators if their fees are fully or partially contingent on the
outcome of the litigation. Pricing, obviously, is a material term at the
very core of any commercial transaction, and the joint venture
between these investors is no exception. In this regard, the
coventurers are confronted with an important threshold question:
whether they can price the claim with some degree of confidence in the
soundness of their prediction regarding the claim value, and, if not,
how to devise an "incomplete contract" that allows them to reprice
with minimum transaction costs. 52
First, it must be understood that the value of a lawsuit to the
investors is actually affected by three related but distinct components.
The first is the value of the "claim" as that term is used in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: "any right to relief . . . arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences." 53 This is the terminal, or expected, value of the claim54
and is the number that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expect
the litigant and her lawyer to put down in good faith as the relief
sought in a complaint.55 The claim is the asset in which a funder is
purchasing "shares" (and is thus equivalent to a company that is
issuing stock). The second component is the value of the option to
51. On plaintiffs as investors in their own lawsuit, see infra text accompanying note 76.
52. On incomplete contracts, see supra note 20.
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1)(A). The subject of this rule is permissive joinder, but the rule
also relates to the idea of claims as all causes of action arising from a related set of facts and for
which relief can be sought. This idea is expressed throughout the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (pleading requirements); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (defenses).
54. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
55. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (requiring that a claim for relief must contain a demand for the
relief sought); FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (stating that by signing a complaint, the party is certifying that
the claims are supported by nonfrivolous arguments and have evidentiary support).
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settle.5 6 As discussed below, the option value is not the same as the
claim value, though the two are related. The third and final
component is the value of transaction costs: the costs that are involved
in effectuating a payment on the claim or option. One must deduct the
transaction costs from the value of the claim or the option. As
discussed below, the key feature of litigation investment is the
uncertainty relating to the value of all three of these components.
The following subsections provide a brief overview of three law-
and-economics schools of thought as they relate to valuation of legal
claims and settlements. The purpose of this exposition is not to take
sides in the academic feuds between the various schools. Rather, it is
to show how each advanced the way we think about lawsuits as assets
or investments. Neoclassical law and economics opened the door
analytically and sensitized lawyers and judges, sociologically
speaking, to the commodification of legal disputes. Behavioral law and
economics then injected the real world into the analysis by focusing on
how humans actually behave. Lastly, financial theory similarly
presented nuance and complexity by introducing the contemporary
understanding of a real options approach.
A. Expected Claim Value and Settlements in Neoclassical Law &
Economics
Neoclassical (traditional) law and economics was first to
conceive of legal disputes as monetizable assets; it viewed them as
commodities, as opposed to, say, relationships. In a seminal piece,
Priest and Klein developed a mathematical model of rational
decisionmaking under uncertainty to address the relationship between
disputes that proceed to trial and those that settle. Their model
predicted that litigants will compare the financial value of a
settlement offer to the expected financial value of trial and, of the two,
select the course of action with the greater expected value.
Accordingly, their model also predicted that trials will occur between
risk-neutral parties only when the difference between the parties'
56. See Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Options-Pricing Approach, 19 J. LEGAL
STUD. 173 (1990) (analyzing litigation under realoptions finance theory); Joseph A. Grundfest &
Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 1267, 1272-73 (2006) (discussing the use of real-options theory to analyze litigation as a
substitute for traditional, net-present-value approaches); Robert J. Rhee, The Effect of Risk on
Legal Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193 (2007) (using option theory to analyze litigation).
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projected risk-adjusted outcome of trial exceeds their joint costs of
proceeding to trial.5 7
Thus, according to this view, the expected value is readily
calculable.5 8 Since the probabilistic value of the lawsuit can be
calculated, settlement is better because litigants can save the cost of
litigation:
[I]f the plaintiff and the defendant have the same beliefs about the trial outcome, then
there should always exist mutually beneficial settlements, because they can each escape
trial costs by settling. . . . [A] mutually beneficial settlement exists as long as the
plaintiffs estimate of the expected judgment does not exceed the defendant's estimate
by more than the sum of their cost of trial.5 9
For our purposes, Priest and Klein's model means that when
considering whether to proceed to trial, a plaintiff and its business
partner, the funder, should multiply the expected damage award by
the probability that the court will award it, subtract the anticipated
litigation costs, add settlement costs, and subtract opportunity gains
from receiving payment now as opposed to a judgment later.60
The methodology used by Priest and Klein, and by much of the
traditional law-and-economics literature, is that of modeling-making
multiple simplifying assumptions to isolate the variable the
researcher wishes to test. 61 Some of their assumptions were alluded to
above: that both parties are risk neutral and that both have the same
beliefs about the trial outcome. Also, importantly, they assume that
the determinants of settlement and litigation are solely economic, including the
expected costs to parties of favorable or adverse decisions, the information the parties
possess about the likelihood of success at trial, and the direct costs of litigation and
settlement. The most important assumption of the model is that potential litigants form
rational estimates of the likely decision, whether it is based on applicable legal
precedent of judicial or jury bias.
6 2
Generally, then, the central premise of neoclassical economic analysis
in this context is that the expected value of a lawsuit is defined as the
57. See generally Priest & Klein, supra note 54.
58. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 78-79 (1997) (critiquing Priest & Klein and
their progeny).
59. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 402-03 (2004).
60. Cf. Alan E. Friedman, Note, An Analysis of Settlement, 22 STAN. L. REV. 67, 80 (1969)
(providing this formula for a plaintiff to compute his bargaining limit).
61. Additional examples of modeling various steps of the litigation process include Bruce L.
Hay, Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1995) (modeling discovery) and
Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379
(1995) (modeling appeals).
62. Priest & Klein, supra note 54, at 4.
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probability of judgment multiplied by the expected damage award.63
In other words, a legal claim is an asset, and litigation is understood
as an investment.64 The effects of risk or uncertainty are reflected in
this model through changes in the relevant discount rate, such that
the riskier the project, the higher the discount rate. (Such models,
therefore, are described as discounted cash flow ("DCF') or net present
value ("NPV") models.)65
Critically, under this traditional simple model of litigation
investment, "[i]n deciding whether to sue or whether to settle, the
litigants consider the costs and benefits under the assumption that
they must either settle promptly or go to trial. There are no
intermediate decisions to be made along the way."6 6 This feature of the
traditional model has stark and important implications: lawsuits are
only expected to be filed if their expected value is positive, and they
will be settled before trial unless the plaintiffs estimates of the
expected judgments exceed the defendant's by at least the sum of their
legal costs.67 Simply put, a trial is an error.68
B. Financial Theory of Litigation
Over the past few decades, however, the investment world has
vastly expanded on expected value analysis by introducing a new
understanding of a real options approach. 69 Real options are options to
modify projects. They reflect the fact that managers manage assets
rather than hold them passively. 70 Real options include the option to
expand, to wait and learn more before investing, to shrink or abandon
63. See id.; see also John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279
(1973); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971);
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in
a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982) (demonstrating the divergence between
private and social goods in litigation and adopting a general model of the economics of litigation).
64. To clarify, this means an investment by the plaintiff, not by third parties.
65. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 56, at 1272-73.
66. Cornell, supra note 56, at 173.
67. Steven Shavell, Suit Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 58 (1982).
68. See SHAVELL, supra note 59, at 403 ("A mutually beneficial settlement amount exists as
long as the plaintiffs and defendant's estimates of the expected judgment do not diverge too
much.").
69. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 56, at 1273 (discussing the "real options" approach as a
supplement for expected value analysis).
70. MYERS & BREALEY, supra note 22, at 268-69.
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the project, or to vary output or production methods.71 Economic
analysis of law lags behind in incorporating the insights generated by
financial theory, but in the past two decades a few scholars have
started to apply finance theory to litigation and claim valuation.72 This
new school of thought posits that rather than understanding litigation
as an asset to which asset-pricing theory should be applied, the better
view is to conceptualize litigation as an option, specifically as an in-
the-money call option. 73
Finance theory recognizes that most investments involve a
series of options. Therefore, the key departure from the traditional
view is in accounting for the sequential nature of decisionmaking in
litigation. 74 Filing a suit is similar to purchasing an option because the
former gives a plaintiff the right to proceed to trial or to settle. Once
the suit is filed, the plaintiff also has various other options prior to the
key decision of whether to settle. These other options include whether
to file certain motions, whether and how to conduct discovery, and
other strategic decisions. These real options affect the value of a
lawsuit, and financial theory is better equipped to account for this
effect:
The interest in real options theory arises, in part, because traditional discounted cash
flow (DCF) approaches to the appraisal of capital-investment projects, such as the
standard net-present-value (NPV) rule, cannot properly capture management's
flexibility to adapt [] to unexpected market developments. Real options analysis solves
this problem by integrating the investment manager's ability to adapt new information
into the model itself. While the traditional DCF and NPV approaches assume a fixed
commitment to full investment at the outset, real option theory models the investment
process as a series of decision points at which investors have the option of adjusting
their investments in response to new information. This perspective supports the insight
that investment projects that can easily be modified . . . are more valuable than those
that do not provide such flexibility. The more uncertain the outlook, the more valuable
this flexibility becomes.
7 5
71. Id. at 269-73, 617.
72. See Oren Bar-Gill, Pricing Legal Options: A Behavioral Perspective, 1 REv. L. & ECON.
203 (2005); Cornell, supra note 56 (discussing the first application of option analysis to legal
bargaining); Grundfest & Huang, supra note 56; Peter H. Huang, Lawsuit Abandonment Options
in Possibly Frivolous Litigation Games, 23 REV. LITIG. 47 (2004); Robert J. Rhee, A Financial
Economic Theory of Punitive Damages, 111 MICH. L. REV. 33 (2012); Rhee, supra note 56.
73. To be precise, positive expected value lawsuits are analogous to in-the-money call
options and negative expected value lawsuits are analogous to out-of-the-money call options. See
Grundfest & Huang, supra note 56, at 1277. "When a lawsuit is filed, the defendant is forced to
write litigation options at prices that depend on the plaintiff's cost of pursuing the suit. The
value of the options . . . depends on an interaction between the specific characteristics of the case
and the rules for civil procedure." Cornell, supra note 56, at 175.
74. Cornell, supra note 56, at 174.
75. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 56, at 1273-74 (emphasis added) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, "DCF does not reflect the value of
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Thus, viewing lawsuits as investments and applying finance theory to
the valuation of these investments has created exciting possibilities.
For example, lawsuits can be viewed as similar to research and
development ("R&D") projects because both involve the search for new
information and allow for adjustment of strategies in response to the
revelation of new information. 76 Thus, third-party funding can be
compared to VC investment in R&D-intensive start-up companies.77
Specifically, researchers and, more relevant to the view advanced
herein, start-up companies modify their course of action by increasing,
decreasing, accelerating, delaying, or terminating expenditures.78
They correct the funding course to enhance value. And staged funding
is their mechanism.
Many consequences follow from this analysis. To name but a
few, a real options analysis has shown that
litigants will rationally settle for amounts that can be far higher or lower than the
claim's expected value even if that expected value is held constant. The extent to which
the lawsuit's real option settlement value diverges from its expected value depends, in
material part, on the variance of the information to be disclosed.... [T]he larger the
variance, the more dramatic and potentially valuable the information waiting to be
disclosed during the course of the lawsuit and the larger the value of the plaintiffs option
to continue or to abandon the litigation .... 7
Negative-value lawsuits can be explained using the real options
approach because once they are understood as out-of-the-money call
options, it is easy to see that plaintiffs are rational in pursuing them
when the cost of the option is less than its value.80 Similarly, trial can
management." MYERS & BREALEY, supra note 22, at 617. But as discussed elsewhere, the
perhaps the greatest value financiers bring to litigation finance (as to VC) is their management
ability (noncash contributions). See Steinitz, The Contract, supra note 18, at 508.
76. From an investment perspective, lawsuits are therefore largely indistinguishable from
R&D projects, and it follows that the tools applied to the economic analysis of R&D projects
might also be profitably applied to the economic analysis of litigation. The literature, however,
reveals a rather remarkable gap between the two fields of study. Over the last two decades or so,
real options analysis has emerged as the state-of-the-art technique for the economic analysis of
R&D and has generated insights that are difficult or impossible to obtain through the application
of more traditional DCF or NPV techniques. Real options analysis has, however, had very little
influence on the economic analysis of litigation. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 56, at 1270-71
(citations omitted).
77. See generally Steinitz, The Contract, supra note 18. There is no conflict between viewing
a plaintiff as an investor and as an entrepreneur since the entrepreneur is an investor. See Fluck
et al., supra note 17, at 2.
78. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 56, at 1269. For suggestions on how to do just that,
namely increase, decrease, accelerate or terminate expenditures in a third-party-funded
litigation, see generally Steinitz & Field, supra note 19, with a special thanks to Abigail Field for
developing the notions of accelerated and supplemental investments in litigation.
79. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 56, at 1276 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 1277.
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be understood as something other than an error: in certain
circumstances, trials can offer a cheaper cost of resolution than
settlement.81
There is an important difference, however, between litigation
options and other options: whereas a "financial option's value is
generally a monotonically increasing function of the variance of the
underlying instrument . . . settlement values can be discontinuous,
nonmonotonic functions of a lawsuit's underlying variance."82 In fact,
scholars have even argued that the potential settlement value of a
lawsuit, like that of a stock, follows the pattern of the so-called
random walk, with the movement of probability of trial outcome as a
function of disclosure.83 Here's why:
Consider a case in which the plaintiffs claim hinges critically on the testimony of a
single witness or on the outcome of a key judicial ruling. Immediately after the witness
testifies or after the ruling issues, the value of the plaintiffs claim will either be sharply
higher or lower than the expected value of the claim just prior to the resolution of the
uncertainty. The plaintiffs willingness to pursue the lawsuit will also rationally change
in response to the new information.
[Moreover,] changes in the parties' relative bargaining power and in their relative
litigation costs can have dramatic and disproportionate effects on a lawsuit's
equilibrium settlement value.84
A closely related idea is that legal probability is not objective, but
rather subjective and indeterminate.8 5 Thus, whereas a probabilistic
assessment of trial outcome is at the heart of the traditional cost-
benefit analysis of the litigation-versus-settlement decision, a real
options approach reveals that the traditional scholarship
forgoes a formal definition of probability and simply assumes it to be a numeric interval
between zero and one . .. [and that this scholarship] blurs the distinction between
81. Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of
Settlement and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 624 (2006).
82. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 56, at 1278.
83. Rhee, supra note 81, at 664. A "random walk" is a mathematical expression of a
trajectory that consists of taking successive random steps. See Karl Pearson, The Problem of the
Random Walk, 72 NATURE 294 (1905) (coining term). According to Rhee, like stock prices,
perceived case values "fluctuate" based on new information. Rhee, supra note 81, at 664. Had
there been a (more) liquid market in legal claims, their price would "trade within a broad range,"
moving "stochastically upon the disclosure of new information and events." Id. In such cases,
"expectation that any individual belief is accurate as to the expected return" is unrealistic. Id.
Despite the lack of liquidity in legal claims there is, in fact, some evidence of this kind of
fluctuation. See Maya Steinitz, Incorporating Legal Claims (forthcoming) (discussing securities
tied to litigation proceed rights that have traded on the NASDAQ).
84. Grundfest & Huang, supra note 56, at 1279.
85. Rhee, supra note 81, at 638-39.
VANDERBILT LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 66:6:1889
matters that are subject to reasonable measurement, such as expected transaction cost,
and those that are qualitatively judged, such as expected trial results.8 6
Indeed, traditional law-and-economics literature models probability as
a quantifiable concept. In contrast, when mathematicians considered
the application of probability to legal action, they rejected the notion
that statistical probability could apply or that such probability is
measureable.87 For example, the mathematician George P61ya, who
examined the ways in which deliberative bodies construe the same
facts and evidence, concluded:
Two jurors who sat through the same proceedings may disagree: one thinks that the
evidence introduced is sufficient proof against the defendant and the other thinks that it
is not. . . . [P]eople may be moved in opposite directions by fears, hopes, prejudices and
sympathies, or by personal differences. . .. Perhaps both jurors are honest and
reasonably unprejudiced, both followed the proceedings with attention, and both are
intelligent, but in a different way. The first juror may be a better observer of demeanor.
He observes the facial expressions of the witnesses, the tics of the defendant; he notices
when an answer is haltingly given; he is impressed by quick motions of the eyes and
little gestures of the hands. The other juror may be a less skillful observer of facial
expressions, but a better judge of social relations: he understands better the milieu and
the circumstances of the people involved in the case. Seeing the same things with
different eyes, honestly and not unintelligently, the two jurors come to opposite
conclusions. 8 8
This description provides a natural segue into behavioral
economics, the branch of economic analysis that takes into account
actual human behavior. Behavioral economics thus nicely
complements financial theory since the latter, as described above,
focuses on taking into account decisionmaking.89
C. Behavioral Economics of Litigation
Behavioral economists of the law seek to explore the
implications of actual human psychology and behavior to the law.
Behavioral economists base their analyses, in particular, on the
documented fact that rationality, willpower, and self-interest are
bounded.90 They articulate as first principle the idea that humans-for
86. Id. at 638.
87. Id. at 645-50 (citing JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 7 (1921))
(distinguishing statistical probability from logical probability and discussing the mathematical
literature).
88. Id. at 649 (quoting GEORGE P6LYA, 2 MATHEMATICS AND PLAUSIBLE REASONING 56
(1968)).
89. Illustrating the connection is Bar-Gill, supra note 72.
90. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1476-77 (1998). All three bounds, the authors note, are well documented in the social
sciences but relatively unexplored in law and economics. Id. This is a direct attack on the central
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our purposes specifically, litigants, decisionmakers (jurors, judges and
arbitrators), and lawyers (including funders, who are often lawyers by
training)91-make systemic judgment errors using heuristics and
biases (mental shortcuts and cognitive illusions).92 Despite the
dismissiveness of many neoclassical economists of the law,93 "by and
large, [] the idea that our minds are susceptible to systemic errors is
now generally accepted."94
Irrationality, bounded self-interest, and willpower all have a
documented effect on the ability of litigants, lawyers, and other
experts to generate viable predictions of litigation outcomes.95 First,
all of the assumptions underlying Priest and Klein's model and the
neoclassical economic theory of law, the foremost of which is the
assumption of rationality, have been shown not to hold when actual
litigants are involved. However, this does not mean that their model is
unimportant. One way to think of the relationship between the two
schools is that neoclassical law and economics is similar to in vitro
scientific experiments, whereas behavioral economics is similar to in
vivo experiments.96 Such an analogy highlights the fact that modeling
may yield results that have explanatory value but not necessarily
predictive value.97
ideas of neoclassical law and economics-those of utility maximization, stable preferences,
rational expectations, and optimal processing of information. Id.
91. Steinitz, supra note 3, at 1315.
92. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (summarizing and
updating Kahneman and Amos Tverskey's works, including Amos Tverskey & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgments Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974), and
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tverskey, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979), as well as their progeny and recent developments in cognitive and
social psychology). "Systemic errors are known as biases, and they recur predictably in particular
circumstances." Id. at 3-4. A heuristic is "a simple procedure that helps find adequate, though
often imperfect, answers to difficult questions." Id. at 98.
93. See Jolls et al., supra note 90, at 1476-77 (arguing human decisionmaking systemically
departs from conventional economic models).
94. KAHNEMAN, supra note 92, at 10.
95. Jolls et al., supra note 90, at 1476-77.
96. "[An] in vitro process [is a] biological experiment or technique carried out in a
laboratory, outside the body of a living organism (literally 'in glass,' for example in a test tube).
By contrast, an in vivo process takes place within the body of an organism." HUTCHINSON
DICTIONARY OF SCIENCE 109 (2006). Because the test conditions in vitro "may not correspond to
the conditions inside of the organism, this may lead to results that do not correspond to the
situation that arises in a living organism." In vitro, PRINCETON, http://www.princeton.edu/
~achaney/tmve/wikil00k/docs/In vitro.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2013). Modeling and the use of
assumptions that are self-consciously counterfactual to gain qualified but valuable insight is
thus similar to in vitro experimentation.
97. Cf. Elizabeth F. Loftus & Willem A. Wagenaar, Lawyers' Predictions of Success, 28
JURIMETRICS J. 437, 441 (1988):
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Since behavioral economics focuses on how humans actually
make decisions, such as litigants' settlement decisions and jurors'
liability and damages decisions, its research can be understood as
describing the reasons for the nonmonotonic nature of litigation value
observed by finance theorists, the effects of which staged funding can
help ameliorate. The following passages illustrate this point by
describing the literature that documents heuristics and biases of
judges, juries, litigants, and lawyers.
In one ground-breaking piece, Guthrie, Rachlinski, and
Wistrich tested the influence of five common cognitive illusions on
judges' decisionmaking: First, they tested "anchoring," the tendency to
make estimates based on irrelevant starting points. 98 Second, they
tested "framing," which is the tendency to treat economically
equivalent gains and losses differently based on context.99 Third, they
tested "hindsight bias," or the human tendency to perceive past events
[Elconomists attempted to explain lawyers' decisions to litigate versus to settle. Their
analysis assumes that a lawyer considers the probable outcomes of further litigation
steps and weighs those outcomes against economic benefits that are likely to be
obtained without further litigation. When we think about a lawyer "considering the
probable outcomes" we naturally ask whether such consideration is done in an
optimistic or pessimistic way, not only by a single lawyer, but also by the opposing
advocate.
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
98. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001).
Litigation often produces anchors-a classic example being settlement offers. During settlement
negotiations, litigants have been shown to be influenced by the opening offers of opposing
parties. Id. at 789 (citing Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Opening Offers and Out-of-Court
Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go a Long Way, 10 OHIo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 1, 12-13
(1994)). Professors Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie found that people evaluating
hypothetical settlement offers were more likely to accept a $12,000 final settlement offer when it
followed a $2,000 opening offer than when it followed a $10,000 opening offer. Korobkin &
Guthrie, supra, at 1, 11-13. Korobkin and Guthrie hypothesized that those who received the
$2,000 opening offer expected to settle for a relatively small amount, so the $12,000 final offer
seemed generous by comparison. See id. On the other hand, those who received the $10,000
opening offer expected to settle for relatively more, so the $12,000 final offer seemed relatively
stingy. See id. The opening offers effectively "anchored subjects' expectations" and influenced
their settlement preferences. See id. at 18; see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 92, at 119; Guthrie et
al., supra, at 794-95.
99. Framing can have a profound impact on civil lawsuits because litigation produces a
natural frame. In most lawsuits, plaintiffs choose either to accept a certain settlement from the
defendant or to gamble, hoping that further litigation will produce a larger gain. Most
defendants, by contrast, choose either to pay a certain settlement to the plaintiff or to gamble
that further litigation will reduce the amount that they must pay. Thus, plaintiffs often choose
between options that appear to represent gains, while defendants often choose between options
that appear to represent losses. As such, plaintiffs are more likely to prefer settlement, the risk-
averse option, while defendants are more likely to prefer trial, the risk-seeking option. Guthrie et
al., supra note 98, at 795 (citations omitted).
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to have been more predictable than they actually were.100 Fourth, they
tested the "representativeness heuristic," which involves ignoring
statistical information-particularly the frequency with which an
underlying category of events occurs-in favor of individuating
information.10' And fifth, they tested the "egocentric bias," which is
the human tendency to overestimate one's own abilities. 102 They
summarized their findings as thus:
We found that each of these cognitive illusions influenced the decision-making processes
of the judges in our study. Although the judges displayed less vulnerability to two of the
five illusions than other experts and laypersons, the results demonstrate that under
certain circumstances judges rely on heuristics that can lead to systematically erroneous
judgments.103
As background, the authors also summarized decades of research on
the effects of similar cognitive illusions of juries, noting that "juries
believe that litigants should have predicted events that no one could
have predicted, allow irrelevant or inadmissible information to
influence liability determinations, defer to arbitrary numerical
estimates, and rely on incoherent methods to calculate damages."104
Legal realism is often caricatured as standing for the
proposition that judicial outcomes hinge on "what the judge had for
breakfast."105 However, recent studies show that legal realists may
have been wrong and that, in fact, judicial decisions also hinge on
judges' lunch and snacks. The eight participants in the study
described below are parole judges:
They spend entire days reviewing applications for parole. The cases are presented [to
them] in random order, and the judges spend little time on each one, an average of 6
minutes. (The default decision is denial of parole; only 35% of requests are approved.)
The exact time of each decision is recorded, and the times of the judges' three food
100. Id. at 799. Due to this bias, people (e.g., jurors) overstate their own ability to have
predicted the past. They then believe that others (e.g., defendants) should have been able to
predict events better than was in fact possible. Studies have therefore found that the hindsight
bias influences decisions on liability. Id. at 800 (discussing juror's hindsight, specifically); see also
KAHNEMAN, supra note 92, at 202 (describing hindsight bias).
101. Guthrie et al., supra note 98, at 805 (explaining that the representativeness heuristic
can lead people to discount relevant statistical information and misjudge as a result); see also
KAHNEMAN, supra note 92, at 151-52.
102. Guthrie et al., supra note 98, at 811-13 (citing Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein,
Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1997,
at 109, 119) (observing that egocentric biases are likely to be "an important determinant of
bargaining impasse").
103. Id. at 784.
104. Id. at 780-81; see also id. at 780-81 nn.12-16.
105. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING 127-29 & n.15 (2009) (tracing the origin of the "what the judge had for breakfast"
quip).
2013] 1913
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:6:1889
breaks-morning break, lunch and afternoon break-are recorded as well. The authors
of the study plotted the proportion of approved requests against the time since the last
food break. The proportion spikes after each meal, when about 65% of requests are
granted. During the two hours or so until the judges' next feeding, the approval rate
drops steadily, to about zero just before the meal ... [T]ired and hungry judges tend to
fall back on the easier default position of denying requests for parole. Both fatigue and
hunger probably play a role. 106
Similarly, the empirical evidence of litigants' biases is
mounting. The list of reasons why litigants' behavior does not, in fact,
comport with the traditional model's predictions is long:
Litigants litigate not just for money, but to attain vindication; to establish precedent; "to
express their feelings"; to obtain a hearing; and to satisfy a sense of entitlement
regarding use of the courts, all of which can easily preclude out of court settlement.
Moreover, their decisions to settle or litigate may be affected by the context of the
choice, the frame in which it is presented, the identity of the person describing the
choice, whether the litigants have faced similar choices before, the litigants' self-serving
biases concerning the fairness of their position, habit, unyielding conceptions of justice,
and myriad other factors. 107
Particularly relevant is empirical evidence of divergence, rather than
convergence, of the parties' assessments of the likely outcome of the
litigation as more information is revealed during the course of
litigation.108 This seems to be the case because litigants interpret the
information egocentrically.109 Further distorting a litigant's rational
assessment of the likelihood of success is the sunk cost
phenomenon,110 subjective psychological costs and litigation fatigue,"'
106. KAHNEMAN, supra note 92, at 43-44.
107. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 58, at 79-81 (providing a string of citations to this body
of empirical evidence).
108. Jolls et al., supra note 90, at 1489-1508.
109. George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, When Ignorance Is Bliss: Information Exchange
and Inefficiency in Bargaining, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 37 (2004). For a comprehensive overview of
the literature on overconfidence, see Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second
Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 111-12, nn.149-50 (1990) (citing
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 287-355 (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds., 1982)).
Overconfidence may result, in part, from the tendency of parties to assess fairness in a biased
manner that favors themselves. For a discussion of fairness biases, see D.M. Messick & K.S.
Cook, Psychological and Sociological Perspectives on Distributive Justice: Convergent, Divergent,
and Parallel Lines, in EQUITY THEORY (D. Messick & K. Cook eds., 1983). See Max H. Bazerman
& Margaret A. Neale, Improving Negotiation Effectiveness Under Final Offer Arbitration: The
Role of Selection and Training, 67 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 543 (1982); Henry S. Farber & Max H.
Bazerman, Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence from a
Comparison of Arbitration Schemes, 104 Q.J. EcON. 99 (1989); see also Jolls et al., supra note 90,
at 1501-04 (discussing Loewenstein & Moore, supra).
110. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 109, at 113-14; Samuel Issacharoff & George
Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure, 73 TEX. L. REV. 753, 760-61
(1995).
111. Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 971-72 (1979).
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reactive devaluation, (i.e., the desire to avoid appearing to capitulate
to an adversary), and status quo bias. 112 All of these factors render
settlement less likely, rather than more likely, in certain cases,
despite the disclosure of information.
Empirical research shows that experts' abilities to predict
success is also subject to systematic errors. While weather forecasters
have been found to be very "well calibrated" (yes, this is not a typo) in
their predictions of uncertain future events, 113 it turns out that, for
example, physicians and psychologists tend to be "poorly calibrated."
It has also been empirically shown that the calibrations of the latter
become even poorer as they are given more information about an
individual's historical background. 114 Practicing auditors in the field of
public accounting were found to be underconfident in their predictions
of uncertain future events." 5 Astonishingly, even statisticians have
been shown to have poor statistical intuition.116
Lawyers, like other experts, also do not transcend human
nature. Multiple studies have shown that even experienced lawyers
are not good at predicting the outcome of litigation: "The results are
consistent: lawyers, insurance adjusters, and judges all err by very
substantial amounts when asked to estimate either the settlement
value or predicted trial outcomes."117 In a striking example,
112. Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency: Reasons for
(Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 425, 433-34 (2005) (citing Chris Guthrie, Better
Settle than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 45-
46) ("On the other hand, the phenomenon of regret aversion (that is, the desire to avoid the
experience of knowing and regretting that one has made a wrong decision) can help to produce
settlement.").
113. Loftus & Wagenaar, supra note 97, at 438-40.
114. Id. Just as depressing, especially to those who are in the business of educating
professionals, studies have found that experts display either roughly the same biases as college
students or the same biases at somewhat reduced levels. SCoTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 258 (1993).
115. Loftus & Wagenaar, supra note 97, at 440.
116. Guthrie et al., supra note 98, at 783 n.26 (providing a literature survey of empirical
studies on cognitive illusions of various professionals, including Craig R. Fox et al., Options
Traders Exhibit Subadditive Decision Weights, 13 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 16 (1996) (finding
that option traders rely on heuristics in probabilistic reasoning), and Gregory B. Northcraft &
Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment
Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 84, 95-96 (1987) (reporting that real estate agents fall prey to anchoring effects when
estimating real estate prices)); KAHNEMAN, supra note 92, at 5 (describing the poor statistical
intuition of statistics professors).
117. Stephen C. Yeazell, Transparency for Civil Settlements: NASDAQ for Lawsuits? 9
(UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, No. 08-15, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1161343; see also Theodore Eisenberg,
Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72 WASH. U. L. REV. 979, 979-81
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One study reported: Sixteen members of the Los Angeles Claims Managers Association
were asked to evaluate-a hypothetical claim. Nine valued the claim at $50,000 to
$150,000; the rest were spread from $6,000 to $750,000. The same variation occurred
among claims staff within a single company, and the more experienced the claims
adjusters, the wider the variation. Settlements of actual cases show similar degrees of
unexplained variations.1 1 8
Psychologists studying the cognitive psychology that assesses
the capabilities of experts (as opposed to novices and lay people) found
that (1) lawyers are overconfident in their chances of winning
(especially in cases in which they had been highly confident to begin
with); and (2) lawyers incorrectly predict that other lawyers are well-
calibrated or underconfident in their predictions." 9 Psychologists note
that lawyers' subjective assessments of probabilities affect case
strategy-for example, a lawyer's analysis of the expected return on
an expensive versus inexpensive expert.120 (Therefore, lawyers' mis-
assessments of expected return can be a cause of value destruction.)
While the authors suggest some ways in which lawyers may be
debiased,121 they depressingly note that studies of other experts'
predictive abilities find that overconfidence actually increases with
the degree of expertise one believes oneself to have.122
(1994) (studying self-serving perceptions of fairness and their effects on the size of fee claims
made by bankruptcy attorneys); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?: A Behavioral
Inquiry into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 100-01 (1993)
(describing how once lawyers commit to client representation, they may be biased in the
construal of information and hence miss warning signs of client fraud); Loftus & Wagenaar,
supra note 97, at 450 (discussing the effect of overconfidence on how lawyers assess the
probability of success); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage
Awards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV.
883, 896 (1993) ("[T]he data do not support the view that the reasoning of laypersons in
calculating the award is substantially different from that of legally trained persons."). But cf.
Molot, supra note 12, at 384 ("[L]awyers are quite well equipped to do what actuaries cannot.
Indeed, lawyers routinely price litigation risk-for themselves and their clients.").
118. Yeazell, supra note 117, at 9-10 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. See Loftus & Wagenaar, supra note 97, at 448-50. Interestingly, the authors found a
similar overconfidence bias among Dutch lawyers suggesting, perhaps, that it transcends legal
cultures (at least within the West). Id. at 450 n.24.
120. Id. at 441-42.
121. Id. at 451 ("One technique involves training people by giving them prompt feedback on
the accuracy of their judgments. . . . [Another] is to encourage people to generate reasons why
their initial judgment might not be correct.").
122. Id. (citing J.V. Bradley, Overconfidence in Ignorant Experts, 17 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC
Soc'Y 82-84 (1981)). The problem of overconfidence, generally, is that:
[N]either the quantity nor the quality of the evidence counts for much in subjective
confidence. The confidence that individuals have in their beliefs depends mostly on
the quality of the story then can tell about what they see . . . our associative system
tends to settle on a coherent pattern of activation and suppresses doubt and
ambiguity.
KAHNEMAN, supra note 92, at 87-88.
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In trying to explain the data, the authors allude to the
"availability heuristic": relying on the ease of memory search for
examples of making judgments about the probability of events and
assessing the relative importance of issues by the ease with which
they are retrieved from memory (which, in turn, is largely determined
by media coverage).123 They write that others124 suggest that
"overconfidence could occur because the lawyer can bring readily to
mind a similar case in which a favorable verdict was achieved, or
because the lawyer fails to bring to mind similar cases in which
unfavorable verdicts were achieved."125
The rarity of trials, exhibited by the fact that the vast majority
of cases settle, further complicates attempts to value litigation
outcomes.126 Therefore, data are inadequate and lawyers' experience is
insufficient to reliably assess the probability of how judges or juries
might decide a particular case.127 Importantly, while there are
numerous legal settlements-by one estimate, this market is believed
to have an annual value of $50 billion-this market is unusual in that
we have no information about it.128 Accordingly, pricing information
for settlements is woefully inadequate in comparison to information
about comparable markets; unlike real estate, for example, lawyers do
not have settlement comparables from which to draw.129
More broadly, financial theory has documented that accurate
predictions of future prices by individual market participants are
impossible, and
there is no reason why this truth does not apply with more force to the predictions of
legal decisions given that a civil action is not subject to market pricing, is not supported
by risk management services or a derivative market, and is one of the most illiquid of
assets or liabilities.
1 30
D. The Accounting Perspective
The Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") has also
weighed in on the question of legal claim valuation. It prohibits
123. KAHNEMAN, supra note 92, at 8.
124. Loftus & Wagenaar, supra note 97, at 438 (citing David Dunning et al., The
Overconfidence Effect in Social Prediction, 58 J. PERS. Soc. PSYCHOL. 568 (1990)).
125. Loftus & Wagenaar, supra note 97, at 450.
126. SHAVELL, supra note 59, at 410 (stating that around ninety-eight percent of cases
settle).
127. Rhee, supra note 81, at 642-44.
128. Yeazell, supra note 117, at 3, 6.
129. Id.
130. Rhee, supra note 81, at 627.
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evaluating and listing a claim as an asset on a balance sheet.131
According to the FASB, a contingency is "an existing condition,
situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible
gain [referred to as a 'gain contingency'] to an enterprise that will
ultimately be resolved when one or more future events occur or fail to
occur."132 Gain contingencies cannot be recognized on a company's
income statement until all contingencies have been resolved.
Disclosure of such gain contingencies can be made when there is a
high probability that the contingency will be realized, but "care should
be exercised to avoid misleading implications as to the likelihood of
realization."133
The mere fact that an estimate is required is not a sufficient
reason to regard an uncertainty as a gain contingency.134 Pending
court cases, however, are a typical example of a gain contingency. 135
Given that they are a typical example, the FASB provides factors that
must be considered when evaluating the probability of an unfavorable
litigation outcome. The factors are the nature of the litigation, the
progress of the case, the opinion (formal letter) of legal counsel, the
experience of the company and others with similar cases
(comparables), and management's anticipated response to the suit.136
Having provided these factors, the FSAB cautions that "the outcome of
131. Selvyn Seidel & Sandra Sherman, Corporate Governance Issues Regarding "Stock Price
Manipulation" and "Insider Trading" (and Other Matters) Are Coming to Third Party Financing,
MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONT. (Mar. 25, 2013), http://litigationfinancecontract.com/corporate-
governance-issues-regarding-stock-price-manipulation-and-insider-trading-and-other-matters-
are-coming-to-third-party-financing/ (discussing disclosure issues surrounding third-party
funding of a public company's claim). For more on the accounting treatment of legal claims and
the obstacles it poses to plaintiffs, see Steinitz, supra note 82.
132. ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 5, at 3
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1975) (citation omitted), available at http://www.fasb.org/
cs/BlobServer?blobkey-id&blobnocache=true&blobwhere=1 175823287525&blobheader=applicati
on%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.
133. ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, available at http://tinyurl.com/keo783c (going on to
note that "as a result, it is unusual to find information about contingent gains in [a] financial
statement").
134. Id. at 1.
135. This is probably the reason why banks do not consider legal cases to be assets and do
not lend based on the value of contingency fees. See Jonathan D. Epstein, An Unusual Financial
Niche: Lending Money to Lawyers, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 30, 2007, at Cl; see also Ben Winograd,
Specialized Lenders Help Fill Financing Void for Law Firms, Am. BANKER, Nov. 2, 2006, at 3
("No matter how large the potential verdict, banks generally will not make loans beyond the
existing assets of a firm or its attorneys."). Both articles are discussed in Engstrom, supra note
32 (manuscript at 13 n.54).
136. ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, supra note 132, at 10.
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pending litigation, however, can seldom be predicted with any
assurance."137
What, then, are a buyer (funder) and a seller (plaintiff) of
stakes in legal claims to do? The next Section ties together the
previous threads and suggests that staged funding is a mechanism
that can allow parties to adjust expenditures and price as information,
risk, and other variables change throughout the life of litigation. Thus,
while pricing a lawsuit may be impossible ex ante, the effects of such
uncertainty can nonetheless be effectively and considerably
minimized. And while lawsuits are different from start-up companies
in important ways (discussed below), staged funding can be adjusted
to accommodate their unique features.
IV. STAGING FUNDING OF LEGAL CLAIMS
As noted at the outset, the broader framework within which
this Article is set views commercial legal claims as similar in
important respects to portfolio companies and views litigation funding
as similar to VC. In this analogy, the litigation financiers are similar
to venture capitalists, plaintiffs are similar to entrepreneurs,
attorneys are similar to managers, and the litigation is similar to the
portfolio company (a start-up).138 The core financial challenges in both
137. ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, supra note 132, at 5. This attitude is understood to
be a derivative of the general conservatism underlying accounting standards: "[tihis also derives
from the accounting postulates of conservatism and realization . . . conservatism [i]s: A prudent
reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that uncertainty and risks inherent in business
situations are adequately considered . . .. However . . . Conservatism . . . should no[t] connote
deliberate, consistent understatement of net assets and profits." PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
FORENSIC ACCOUNTING TECHNICAL NOTES: SFAS 5, "ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES" 3,
available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/37635538/SFAS-5_-Accounting-for-Contingen
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The idea of not recognizing contingent
gains goes way back in the history of accounting. In the eighteenth century, accounting treatises
advised bookkeepers to create so-called fictional accounts, which disclosed potential gains (e.g.,
from a shipment still at sea), but which segregated the amount of any such gains from the
business's regular accounts kept on an accrual basis. For a discussion of this history, see SANDRA
SHERMAN, FINANCE AND FICTIONALITY IN THE EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: ACCOUNTING FOR
DEFOE 129-55 (1996). I thank Sandra Sherman for helping me parse out the accounting
literature.
138. See Steinitz, The Contract, supra note 18, at 490 (drawing, for an analysis of the
economics of VC and the associated contracting practices, on GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 29,
at 127; Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2003); and Gompers & Lerner, supra note 29, at 465);
see also Fluck et al., supra note 17; Zsuzsanna Fluck et al., Venture Capital Contracting: Staged
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types of finance are that they are characterized by extreme
uncertainty, extreme information asymmetry, extreme agency
problems, and the problem of effort provision.
All these translate into a pricing challenge: how should a
litigation funder price a venture that is thus characterized? This
problem is compounded by data suggesting that a litigation funder is
unlikely to be good at predicting claim value (no matter how
experienced its principals and staff lawyers are) and that good faith
estimates from the litigators are likely similarly flawed. The plaintiff
faces a similar problem: how to price the claim and, particularly, how
to avoid overselling interests in the litigation at a point in time where
it might be particularly desperate for funding (especially if a statute of
limitations clock is ticking).
Multiple solutions have been devised in VC to deal with an
equivalent challenge. The hallmark feature is staged funding, which
minimizes all four problems discussed above and allows the portfolio
companies to modify their course of action by increasing, decreasing,
accelerating, delaying, or terminating expenditures in reaction to
additional information.
Staged financing, as described in Part III, addresses
information asymmetry and extreme uncertainty by allowing the
funder to reassess its involvement based on an updated valuation as
more information is revealed. The funder may also simply decline to
participate further. By being an iterative process, staged funding
allows funders to increase or decrease expenditures as necessary.
Staged financing also addresses agency costs: the risk of losing future
funding incentivizes entrepreneurs and plaintiffs to cooperate and
expand efforts.
It is important, however, to recognize that litigation differs
from start-up companies in a few critical ways that justify modifying
the specifics of staged funding when the investment in question is
litigation. The key difference I focus on here is the one relating to
valuation-namely, on the fact that a lawsuit's settlement values over
time are discontinuous, nonmonotonic functions of a lawsuit's
underlying variance, whereas the value of a start-up is, generally
speaking, monotonic.
Financing and Syndication of Later-stage Investments (May 23, 2008) (unpublished manuscript)
(presented at the Conference on the Corporate Finance and Governance of Privately Held Firms),
available at http://www.bi.eduloslofiles/ccgr/fluck-garrison-myers.pdf. The similarities have




Other differences include the fact that the ability of funders to
obtain control is curtailed by the law of champerty. 139 Though,
importantly, litigation funders will bargain for termination rights,
which de facto mean they can 'shut down' a litigation. Another key
difference is the heightened vulnerability of litigants if funding runs
out prematurely. This heightened vulnerability arises because
litigants face opponents, not competitors, and because their timelines
are externally dictated by the applicable rules of procedure and by a
judge.140
In some more detail, a claim's potential value differs from a
start-up's value because plaintiffs "sell" to "markets" that are
completely different than the ones in which tech start-ups operate. In
litigation, the "market" is comprised of judges, jurors, arbitrators, and
the defendant. The parties have very little ability to affect who their
target market is (predominantly via forum shopping, attempts to
disqualify judges or arbitrators, and by challenging jurors). In
contrast, entrepreneurs can choose, shift, and seek to expand their
target markets in a way unimaginable to a plaintiff. Moreover, after
"selling" the claim to the judge or jury, the claim value is fixed. In
contrast, a company can expand its customer base, and therefore its
value, in a potentially unlimited fashion. To appreciate both of these
features of start-ups, consider Amazon's evolution from a bookseller to
a general marketplace.
Entrepreneurs can affect potential value by adapting their
products in response to test marketing. Litigants' options are much
more limited. While litigants can frame the "nucleus of operative
facts" 14' as different causes of action and try to affect a change in the
applicable doctrine by advancing novel legal arguments, the facts and
the governing law are what they are. Consequently, while the value of
139. See Steinitz & Field, supra note 19, at 18. On Champerty and its effects on trading in
legal claims generally, see Sebok, supra note 12, at 61.
140. See Steinitz & Field, supra note 19, at 39. The adaptation of staged funding to litigation
funding in this section draws heavily on Maya Steinitz & Abigail C. Field, Staging Litigation
Funding, MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONT., http://litigationfinancecontract.com/staging-litigation-
funding/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2013), and I thank Abigail C. Field for her contributions in
developing this point. See also Robert J. Rhee, Litigation Financing and Time Dilution, MODEL
LITIG. FIN. CONT. (Jan. 23, 2013), http://litigationfinancecontract.com/2013/01/:
[A]n opponent can undermine the financial investment through manipulation of the
action to affect investment returns. The concern is more acute for repeat players that
may have an incentive to undermine the method of financing . . .. One can envision a
set of circumstances in which an opponent makes a strategic settlement offer
calculated to create a divergence of interest between the financial investor and the
invested party.
141. See, e.g., United Mine Workers ofAm. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
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a commercial claim can rise or fall, and while the investors (plaintiffs,
litigators, and funders) can affect such fluctuation to some degree,
changes by an order of magnitude are very unlikely, and the generally
upward trajectory of a start-up that is proceeding on track has no
parallel in litigation.
Below are examples of some points that contracting parties
entering a litigation-funding agreement should therefore consider
when modifying staged funding, as it evolved in VC, to reflect the
differences in valuation trajectories throughout the life of a
litigation. 142
A. Selecting Litigation Milestones
Technology start-ups, while each unique, share a common path
of development. Key milestones are quite standard and include the
creation of a business plan, the development of the technology, launch
and early customer traction, scaling and adoption, and mass
expansion.143 While litigation, in theory, has a similarly predictable
structure-precomplaint, complaint, discovery, trial, appeal-
variations (and their effect on claim value) are dramatic. Some cases
will involve motions for summary judgment or motions to dismiss as
key steps. Others will not. In some cases, documentary discovery will
yield the most information; in others, one, some, or all of the
depositions will reveal significant information. In some cases, an
interlocutory appeal may be dispositive; in others, such appeals will
play no role. 144 For example, there are reasons to believe that in
international arbitrations, a funding favorite, postarbitration
enforcement actions may be where most of the uncertainty lies.
Critically, an adversary may unilaterally and unpredictably
impose a crucial milestone-for example, by filing a potentially
142. Concrete contractual provisions that do so are available in Steinitz & Field, supra note
19.
143. For a graphic depiction of these stages, their association with a monotonic increase in
valuation, and a potentially uncapped earning potential, see Nathan Beckord, Start-up
Valuation: How Much is Your Company Worth?, SEED STAGE CAP. (Jan. 19, 2010, 4:19 PM),
http://www.seedstagecapital.com/2010/01/start-up-valuation-how-much-is-your.html.
144. For an example of a real life financing that entailed staged financing pegged to
litigation milestones, see the financing of Crystallex International Corporation's arbitration
against venezuelad. See CRYSTALLEX INT'L CORP., MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2012, at 5 (2013), available at http://www.crystallex.com
/files/KRY%202012%2OYear%20end%20MDnA vOOlu9xz34.pdf (last visited September 29,




dispositive motion or by deciding to engage in "gcorched earth"
litigation to turn a particular case into a warning for further plaintiffs
and funders. 145 Litigation, in sum, is full of procedural surprises. In
contrast with substantive surprises, which may be analogous to twists
and turns in the developments of a start-up's technology, procedural
variables do not have a counterpart in VC, and they greatly contribute
to the nonmonotonic trajectory of claim value. Therefore, parties
should give close consideration to the selection of milestones. Blindly
relying on milestones selected in previous engagements may not be
appropriate.
B. Exit, Valuation, and the Transaction Costs of Staged Funding
Given the nonmonotonic and potentially discontinuous
variation in lawsuit valuation, multiple investment rounds with
multiple corresponding contracts may not be appropriate. The
transaction costs of negotiating such rounds can be high and are only
justified if they hold the promise of setting a more accurate value and
distributing it equitably among the parties. In litigation, it is perhaps
more prudent to have certain milestones that allow for exit only,
namely triggering events that allow for termination for cause, with or
without additional milestones that allow for valuation. For example, a
potentially dispositive motion by the plaintiff (such as a motion to
dismiss or a motion for summary judgment), the conclusion of
discovery, or a settlement offer may be a milestone that warrants a
new valuation despite the cost of such valuation.
C. Syndication
A related difference between litigation and start-ups relates to
the holdup problem and to syndication. Syndication of later rounds is
an imperfect solution to holdup in the litigation-finance context
because in the VC context, syndication exerts upward pressure on
share price during negotiations. For the reasons discussed above,
however, repricing is warranted less often in litigation, and value
increase is generally less dramatic (for example, is capped by provable
damage the plaintiff suffered with no availability of production
145. This is, for example, Chevron's tactic in the Chevron-Ecuador litigation where Chevron,
which is spending an estimate $140 million (USD) in legal fees a year on this twenty-year-old
litigation, recently brought RICO claims against the contingency lawyers and later joined as




diversification and market expansion). The best way to get the
plaintiff-benefiting pricing impact of syndication is to have
competitive bidding at the outset of the claim (as well as at any later
repricing round, if any).
D. Increasing, Decreasing, Accelerating, or Delaying Expenditures
Given the extra layer of procedural uncertainties in addition to
the substantive uncertainties discussed above, it is arguably even
more important for parties to a litigation-finance relationship to be
able to adjust expenditure outlays. In the litigation-finance context,
attempts to do so in a contract negotiated at the outset or on an
ongoing basis untied to litigation milestones can be perceived as a
mechanism for impermissibly influencing attorneys' independent
judgment. 146 Through staged funding, parties can clearly peg such
measures to case developments, dispelling such concerns.
V. CONCLUSION
Understanding litigation as an investment by the plaintiff and
the financiers (attorneys or third-party funders), understanding
lawsuits as assets, and distinguishing those from the option to settle
opens up important possibilities for plaintiffs and financiers to develop
incomplete contracts with finely tuned staging mechanisms. These, in
turn, will allow all parties involved to minimize the effects of
uncertainty and better price their bargain, thereby optimizing the
distribution of the litigation's proceeds between its different
investors-far beyond practices common today-despite the inherent
difficulty (indeed, impossibility) of pricing lawsuits ex ante.
Such funding contracts, which are more efficient for the
funders and more equitable for plaintiffs, will also allow the expansion
of litigation finance to additional claims that may currently be
perceived as too risky. The result: increased access to justice. Since the
commodification of legal disputes, the liquidity in legal claims, and the
liquidity in law firm ownership are exponentially growing due to
radical shifts in the markets-predominantly in the form of third-
party funding of claimants and investments in law firms-the time
has come for greater sophistication in dealing with the complexities of
pricing legal claims.
146. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2012) (requiring that a lawyer use
independent professional judgment in representing a client).
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